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I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature Of The Case.
On November 26 and 27, 2017, Plaintiffs Audra Fell and Steven Fell (hereinafter

collectively "Plaintiffs" individually "Mrs. Fell" and "Mr. Fell") were patrons of Defendant Fat
Smitty's dba the First Street Saloon. After spending the night drinking, Plaintiffs got into an
altercation outside the First Street Saloon that ended with Mr. Fell being stabbed by another patron
named LaDonna Hall ("Ms. Hall" or "L. Hall"). Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant
alleging negligence based on its service of alcoholic beverages to Ms. Hall who had been "drinking
heavily that night", among other theories alleged against Defendant.

B.

Course Of Proceedings.
The Complaint was filed on April 2, 2018 and Defendant filed its Answer and Demand for

Jury Trial on May 8, 2018.

R., Vol. I, pp. 8-17. On March 1, 2019, Defendant Fat Smitty's dba

the First Street Saloon ("Defendant")(also referred to interchangeably by witnesses as "First Street
Saloon" or "Fat Smitty's") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Motion") 1 with
the Bonneville County District Court ("trial court"). Defendant's Motion set forth three separate
arguments: 1) that Plaintiffs' case is barred by operation of Idaho's Dram Shop Act; 2) that
Defendant owed no legally cognizable duty; and 3) that Plaintiffs' case should be dismissed based
on Plaintiffs' bad faith misconduct. See e.g. R., Vol. 1, p. 28. On March 26, 2019, Plaintiffs filed
a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' Response")
and supporting papers including a Declaration of Counsel, which attached the Declaration of

1

In support of Defendant's Motion, Defendant also filed a Memorandum, Affidavit of Counsel for Defendant,
Affidavit of Lorinda K. Tuttle (Paralegal with Defendant's counsel's office), and Affidavits of Roxanne V. Smith
and Wesley T. Smith (the owners of the First Street Saloon), which were filed contemporaneously with Defendant's
Motion. See R. Vol. I, pp. 18-111 and Vol. II, pp. 112-128.
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Angela Burke along with other exhibits. R. Vol. II, pp. 129-161, 179-222 and Vol. III, pp. 223243. On April 03, 2019, Defendant filed a Reply Brief and Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel in
Support of Defendant's Motion, as well as a Motion to Strike Paragraphs 3 and 4 from the
Declaration of Angela Burke. R., Vol. II, pp. 162-178, Vol. III, pp. 301-304 and 244-300. On April
10, 2019, the Court held a hearing on Defendant's Motion and counsel for the parties presented
oral argument at the hearing. See Tr., Vol. 1., p. 6, 11. 1-11. The trial court denied Defendant's
Motion to Strike at the hearing. Id. at pp. 10-11, 11. 15-25 and 1-13. On April 12, 2019, the trial
court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion granting Defendant's
Motion. R., Vol. 3, pp. 305-310. The trial court ruled that Plaintiffs' case is subject to Idaho's
Dram Shop Act (LC. § 23-808)(hereinafter generally "the Act") and therefore Plaintiffs had an
obligation to comply with the statutory notice requirement requirement, set forth under LC. § 23808(5). Id. at p. 309. As Plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirement the Court dismissed
Plaintiffs' case and entered a corresponding Judgment on April 12, 2019. Id. at pp. 309 and 311.
On April 25, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal with the trial court. Id. at pp. 313315. On May 9, 2019, Defendant filed a Request for Additional Transcript and Record pursuant to
LA.R. 19, requesting that the Court Reporter's transcript from the summary judgment hearing on
April 10, 2019 and all of Defendant's pleadings supporting its Motion be added to the Clerk's
Record. Id. at pp. 324-327. Plaintiffs did not object to Defendant's request and on June 4, 2019 the
District Court entered an Order granting the same. Id. at pp. 328-329.

On October 7, 2019,

Plaintiffs filed their Supreme Court Appellants' Brief ("Appellants ' Brief') arguing that the trial
court erred in granting Defendant's Motion and that this Court should overturn the trial court's
dismissal. See generally Appellant's Brief at pp. 8-21. In short, Plaintiffs allege that the Act and
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its notice requirement are inapplicable in this case. Id. Defendant now files its' Respondent's Brief,
and for the reasons set forth herein respectfully requests this Court affirm the trial court's decision.
C.

Statement Of Facts.

a.

Facts re: Subject Incident

This is a personal injury action stemming from a fight/stabbing that occurred the night of
November 26-27, 2016 outside the First Street Saloon. R., Vol. 1 at pp. 8-11. The primary
individuals who were involved in the confrontation included Plaintiffs Steven Fell ("Mr. Fell")
and Audra Fell ("Mrs. Fell"), Ms. Hall's mother Pamela Hall ("P. Hall"), and Ms. Hall who was
the third-party tortfeasor/assailant who stabbed Mr. Fell during the confrontation. R., Vol. 1 at pp.
9-10. Each of those individuals had been patrons of the First Street Saloon earlier in the night but
had left the bar, or been escorted from the bar, prior to the confrontation that resulted in Mr. Fell
being stabbed. R., Vol. 1, pp. 22-23. While they were outside of the bar, Plaintiffs got into a
verbal/physical altercation with P. Hall and Ms. Hall, during which Ms. Hall stabbed Mr. Fell
("subject incident"). Id. at pp. 8-11
The facts surrounding the subject incident were clarified during several depositions that
were taken during the underling litigation, including that of Defendant's employee and bartender
Rachel Lynn Welker-Mate ("Ms. Welker"), who was not on shift at the time of the subject incident
but was present at the bar. See Transcript from Deposition of Rachel Welker-Mate ("Welker
Deposition"), R., Vol. 3, pp. 258-259, 11. 45:15-25 and 46:12-16. In the early morning hours of
November 27, 2016, as the First Street Saloon was closing, P. Hall began yelling about her cell
phone. Id. at p. 261, 11. 57:7-11. As she was being difficult, she was escorted from the bar by
individuals that included Mr. Welker. Id. at p. 261, 11. 57:7-21. After she was escorted outside, P.
Hall began banging on the door demanding to be let back in, apparently believing she had left her
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 3

cell phone inside. Id. at pp. 261-262, 11. 57:11-58:11. Ms. Welker responded that if Pamela Hall
did not cease her actions, the cops would be called and as she did not, Ms. Welker informed another
bartender named Alex Clawson ("Mr. Clawson") to call the police. Id. at p. 262, 11. 58:25-59:4.
After Ms. Welker had informed the individuals outside that the police were on their way, an
altercation commenced between Ms. Hall and P. Hall, and Mrs. Fell attempted to intervene; Ms.
Hall then struck Mrs. Fell in the face and Ms. Welker restrained Mrs. Fell and took her back inside
the bar. Id. at 11. 59:8-16. The last thing that Ms. Welker witnessed outside, before she was able to
get Mrs. Fell restrained and inside the bar, was Mr. Fell grabbing Ms. Hall by her ankles and then
proceeding to hang her upside down while holding her by the ankles. Id. at 11. 61: 14-19. With Ms.
Welker and Mrs. Fell inside the bar, the only people who were left outside at that time were Mr.
Fell, P. Hall and Ms. Hall. Id. at p. 263, 11. 61 :20-24.

Subsequently, a physical altercation

transpired and at some point during the altercation Mr. Fell was stabbed in the abdomen by Ms.
Hall causing the personal injury damages he is seeking to recover from Defendant. See Transcript
from Deposition ofPlaintiff Steven Fell (''S. Fell Deposition") R. Vol. 1, p. 49, 11. 28:7-29:6.

Prior to filing the Complaint that initiated this litigation, Plaintiffs had sent a demand letter
dated December 7, 2017 to Defendant's owners Wesley and Roxanne Smith. More than a year
after the subject incident. R., Vol. 2, pp. 117-120. As demonstrated by the Affidavits of Mr. and
Mrs. Smith, that letter was the first notice provided by Plaintiffs of their intention to file a claim
or cause of action with regard to the subject incident. R., Vol. 1, pp. 109-111 and Vol. 2, pp. 112115. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on April 2, 2018, naming the First Street Saloon as the sole
Defendant. R. at p. 8. Plaintiffs' Complaint made allegations pertaining to Defendant's service of
Ms. Hall and/or Ms. Hall's intoxication level on the night of the subject incident in multiple
paragraphs. In introducing Ms. Hall, Plaintiffs' allege that "[a]nother patron at the Bar, LaDonna
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 4

Hall, had been drinking heavily throughout the evening of November 26, 2017." Id. at p. 9,

,r 8.

Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant "did not train its agents or employees on how to remove
dangerous customers from its bar or how to refuse service to a customer." Id. at p. 10

,r

14.

Plaintiffs' cause of action against Defendant, alleging "Negligence Against Fat Smitty's, L.L.C."
includes the following pertinent claims: that Defendant breached a duty by "failing to properly
train its agents or employees"; that Defendant breached a duty "by failing to cease service to
LaDonna Hall"; and such negligent conduct "directly and proximately caused" Plaintiffs' claimed
injuries/damages. Id. at pp. 10-11, ,r,r 21-25.
Plaintiffs made every effort in discovery to try and establish that First Street Saloon's
service of Ms. Hall was a proximate cause of the subject incident/Plaintiffs' injuries. The included
inquiries during depositions exploring: facts related to issues of "overserving" including policies
and procedures in place as to when to cut a patron off; Ms. Hall's level of intoxication during the
night of the subject incident and at the time/immediately before; whether First Street Saloon knew
how much Ms. Hall had to drink on the night of the subject incident and whether she was visibly
intoxicated and continued to be served drinks; whether the First Street Saloon was aware that she
was intoxicated; and other general facts regarding Defendant's service of Ms. Hall on the night of
the subject incident. 2

2

Welker Deposition, R., Vol. 3, p. 260 at 11. 50:21-51:3 ("Q. Did you ever ask Alex how much he had given her to
drink? A. No, I did not. I could tell she was intoxicated. That's why when I showed up to help him close, I ended up
taking her drink and her mother's drink and dumping them and told him, "Do not serve them any more. You need to
cut them off. They are extremely intoxicated."'); see also Transcript from Deposition of Jack Kline ("Kline
Deposition") Id. at p. 290 and 292 at 11. 15:12-23 and 54:9-55:11 ("Q. Did you see them drinking? A. Sure. Q. You
saw LaDonna drinking? A. Sure. Q. How many drinks did you see her have? A. I have no idea."); see also Transcript
from Deposition of Lawanna Radford ("Radford Deposition") Id. at p. 296, 11. 24:25-25:10 ("Q. Did they ever train
you on how to handle a customer that the [sic] been overserved? A. No. I pretty much already knew that. They didn't
have to, you know, train a whole lot of anything."); see also Transcript from Deposition of Wesley Smith ("W. Smith
Deposition"), Id. at p. 300, 11. 27:19-24 ("Q[ ... ] how does a bartender know when to cut somebody off? A. By-I would
think by just their presence, you know. They have an idea of drinks served to them, maybe, in their establishment.").
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The deposition ofRachel Lynn Welker-Mate perhaps best exemplifies Plaintiffs' counsel's
insistence on pursuing this theory and inquiring into facts to support it, asking various questions
regarding First Street Saloon's Service of Ms. Hall and Ms. Welker' s knowledge (and the
knowledge of bartender Alex Clawson) regarding how much she had drank on the night of the
subject incident and her level of intoxication. See R., Vol. 3, p. 260, 11. 51: 10-16 ("A. Did you ever
talk to LaDonna later about how much she had to drink that night? A. No, I did not. Actually, that's
not true. She called me from jail and told me that she didn't remember anything[ ... ] She was
blacked-completely blacked out drunk.") In fact, Plaintiffs' counsel asked Ms. Welker on a few
occasions about her knowledge of how much Ms. Hall had been served and with regard to her
testimony that she told Mr. Clawson to cut them off/stop serving Ms. Hall and her mother. See Id.,
p. 260-261 at 11. 50: 18-51 :3, 51: 10-16, 53 :3-11, 56:5-18. Ms. Welker also described what happened
shortly before closing, and therefore shortly before the subject incident, where she indicated that
shortly before last call she "dumped" the drinks that had been served to Ms. Hall and P. Hall she
told the bartender Alex Clawson to cut them off/stop serving them; despite that statement Ms.
Welker later saw they had been served two more drinks, which caused her to reiterate "'don't serve
them any more"'. Id., p. 260 at 11. 52:11-53:16. The issue of over-service was also addressed in
Plaintiffs' papers filed in Response to Defendant's Motion, specifically within the Declaration of
Alex Clawson, which states that he served Ms. Hall "multiple drinks" on the night of the subject
incident and observed that "later in the night she was very intoxicated." R., Vol. 3, p. 239 at ,r 3.
Mr. Clawson also claimed he received "no training from Fat Smitty's, LLC, its owners, or its
managers regarding when to stop serving alcohol to a bar patron." Id., p. 240 at ,r 4.
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b.

Facts re: Defendant's Prior Knowledge of Ms. Hall

During the depositions taken during this litigation, the individuals who owned or were
employed by the First Street Saloon have all consistently testified that they had never seen Ms.
Hall carry a knife/weapon or otherwise known that she carried a weapon prior to the subject
incident. In fact, Ms. Welker (who was a bartender for the First Street Saloon at the time), Jack
Kline and LaWanna Radford (the managers of the First Street Saloon at the time) and Wesley
Smith and Roxanne Smith (the owners of the First Street Saloon), all testified that they had never
seen Ms. Hall carry a knife (or any other weapon) or had otherwise ever been aware that she carried
any type of weapon prior to the occurrence of the subject incident. 3 As such, according to all the
deposition testimony taken during the underlying litigation, none of the employees or owners of
the First Street Saloon had ever seen Ms. Hall carry a knife/weapon and did not know if she had
ever carried a knife/weapon prior to the night of the subject incident. Id.
The only person who claimed to know that Ms. Hall had a knife was Jason Dixon ("Mr.
Dixon"), who said that Ms. Hall attempted to sell him a knife "earlier in the day" prior to the
subject incident. See Transcript from Deposition of Jason Dixon ("Dixon Deposition"), R., Vol.
1, p. 105, 11.. 26:6-29:21. However, Mr. Dixon was not employed by the bar in any capacity, had
no involvement with the bar except as a patron and he specifically testified that he did not tell Ms.
Welker about the knife until the day following the subject incident. Id. Ms. Welker confirmed this
as she expressly testified she "never saw [Ms. Hall] get into an altercation or verbal argument with
anybody at the First Street Saloon." Welker Deposition, Id. at pp. 64, 65 and 66, 11. 65:18-25, 77:7-

3

See Transcript from Deposition of Roxanne V. Smith ("R. Smith Deposition") R., Vol. 1, p. 84, 11. 5:1-3; see also
Radford Deposition at p. 84, 11. 75:16-25; see also Kline Deposition,ld. at p. 92, 11. 71:9-11; see also Welker
Deposition,ld. at p. 64, 11. 63:7-16; see also W. Smith Deposition, Id. at p. 73 at 11. 39:24-40:5.
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17, 80:12-15 and 81:4-7. Ms. Welker's testimony was further confirmed by her husband Mr.
Dixon's testimony. Dixon Deposition, Id. at p. 105, 11. 29:2-8. In addition to the lack ofknowledge
as to the knife, it has been consistently testified by the owners/employees of the First Street Saloon,
as well as by the Plaintiffs, that the subject incident was the first verbal or physical altercation they
had ever witnessed at the First Street Saloon involving Ms. Hall. Ms. Welker, both managers (Jack
Kline and LaWanna Radford) and both owners (Wesley Smith and Roxanne Smith) all testified
that they had no knowledge, or reason to know, that Ms. Hall had any violent propensities. 4
c.

Facts re: Misconduct of Mr. Fell/Facebook Message to Ms. Welker

During the pendency of this litigation, a paralegal with defense counsel's office contacted
Rachel Welker to discuss her knowledge of the subject incident and any other relevant knowledge
she might possess. R., Vol. 2, p. 122 at ,r 3. During that conversation, Ms. Welker indicated that
she had received a Facebook message from Mr. Fell who had offered her money in exchange for
her providing favorable testimony. Id. at pp. 122 at

,r 4.

Ms. Welker took screenshots of her

Facebook page that included the messages that had been sent to her and provided them to Ms.
Tuttle, and from those screen shots Ms. Tuttle prepared a written transcript of the messages. Id. at
pp. 122 at

,r 4 and pp.

125-128. At Mr. Fell's deposition, the a copy of all the screenshots and

4

See S. Fell Deposition, R., Vol. 1, p. 50, 11. 51 :14-19 ("other than the night in question-ever witness LaDonna Hall
getting involved in any verbal or physical confrontations-A. No. Q. -at First Street Saloon or elsewhere? A. No.");
see also Welker Deposition, R., Vol. 3, p. 65, 11. 78:14-18 ("before this incident [with Plaintiffs and LaDonna Hall]
had ever happened, nobody had said anything. We had no knowledge of her getting into any type of situation at any
other bars. Nobody had even spoken up and said anything to any ofus."); see also W. Smith Deposition, R., Vol. 1, p.
73, 11. 39:24-40:5 ("Q. To your knowledge, has [Ms. Hall] been at any time denied access to any other bar in Idaho
Falls? A. I have no idea, no."); see also R. Smith Deposition,Id. at p. 76, 11. 5:1-3 (indicating Wesley Smith's testimony
was accurate); see also Radford Deposition, Id. at p. 82, 11. 68:6-9 ("Q. Prior to the incident, did you ever observe [Ms.
Hall] in any kind of verbal or physical altercation with anyone? A. Never. Never."); see also Klein Deposition, Id. at
p. 91, 11. 66:3-67:21 (prior to subject incident never saw Ms. Hall get into any verbal altercations or physical
altercations and she was "pretty much a loner").
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transcript were introduced as Exhibit 2 and presented to Mr. Fell, which he admitted accurately
reflected messages he had sent to Ms. Welker. See S. Fell Deposition, R., Vol. 1, p. 51, 11. 55:2356:20. He indicated he sent the message as he believed Ms. Welker's testimony was essential to
his case and believed she would help prove Ms. Hall had some dangerous proclivities and that the
First Street Saloon had knowledge of them. Id. at p. 51, 11. 56:18-57:16. However, when Mr. Fell
became aware Ms. Welker's testimony was not going to be favorable, he sent her the Facebook
message because Ms. Welker represented a "huge part [of his case] [and he] felt as though it was
falling apart." Id. at 11. 57:11-14. Mr. Fell further testified as follows:
"Q. So you indicate in the beginning-and I'll just read this to you. 'Hi Rachel. How are
you? I'm sending you this so I can maybe talk you into helping me. Your testimony is the
only thing that could hold me back on this lawsuit.' Did I read that correctly A. Yes."
S. Fell Deposition, R., Vol. 1, p. 51, 11. 56:23-57:4.Through that message Mr. Fell tried to "talk

[Ms. Welker] into helping" him prove his case because he believed her testimony was the only
thing "that could hold [him] back" 5, and that the "only people [he] is trying to get to pay the bills
is [Defendant's] insurance". Id. at p. 52, 11. 59:8-20. Mr. Fell further confirmed under oath he was
willing to pay Ms. Welker two months worth of rent in exchange for the favorable story he was
seeking to have her tell. S. Fell Deposition, R., Vol. 1, p. 53, 11. 62:1-14. 6 During Ms. Welker's
deposition she testified that she never had any knowledge that Ms. Hall had carried a knife prior
to the subject incident, had never seen her demonstrate any dangerous or violent proclivities at the

6

"Q. So at the end it states "You help me out on this, and I swear as God is my witness I will pay two months of
your rent when the money comes in and there will be no negative backlash, I swear. So what did you mean by that?
A. The negative backlash is I wasn't going after any individuals, and I just-my whole case, I felt like, had fallen
apart. I needed her to get in there and just be honest about what she told me. I don't know why it came out so easily
to me and then she denied everything to my lawyer. Q. And in exchange for that story, you were offering to pay her
two months' rent? A. Yes." S. Fell Deposition, R., p. 53, 11. 62:1-14)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 9

First Street Saloon, and other than the subject incident she "never saw [LaDonna Hall] get into an
altercation or verbal argument with anybody at the First Street Saloon." Welker Deposition, Id. at
pp. 64, 65 and 66, 11. 65:18-25, 77:7-17, 80:12-15 and 81:4-7; see also Dixon Deposition, Id. at p.
105, 11. 29:2-8. Ms. Welker explained that she told Mr. Fell that she was willing to talk to his
lawyers but that she would be "100% honest" with them and expressly denied ever telling a story
inconsistent with her testimony. Welker Deposition, Id. at p. 67 at 11. 89:10-90:12.
Based on that background, the trial court concluded there was no dispute Defendant served
Ms. Hall and that she "was intoxicated at the time of the incident, thereby implicating § 23-808"
and also concluded there "is no dispute that Plaintiffs did not provide notice of the claim within
180 days of the incident" and dismissed the action as a matter oflaw. R., Vol. 3, p. 320.
II.

A.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Issue On Appeal.
1. Whether the trial court's decision to dismiss this action based on Plaintiffs' failure to
comply with Idaho's Dram Shop Act's mandatory notice requirement under I.C. § 23808( 5) should be affirmed?
2. Assuming arguendo the Court were to decide issue one in the negative, did the trial court
abuse its discretion in overruling Defendant's Motion to Strike Paragraphs 3 and 4 to the
Declaration of Angela Burke?
3. Assuming arguendo the Court were to decide issue one in the negative, whether the trial
court's dismissal of this action should be affirmed based on one of the other arguments
raised by Defendant in its Motion for Summary Judgment?

B.

Costs And Fees On Appeal.
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 35(b)(5), 40, and 41(a), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

54(e) and Idaho Code § 12-121, Defendant contends it is entitled to an award of the costs and
attorney fees incurred on appeal. See Argument, infra, at Section III, sub-paragraph E.
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III.
A.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITY

Standard Of Review.

An appeal of a trial court order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court utilizes the same standard used by the trial court in ruling on the
motion for summary judgment. City of Idaho Falls v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 163 Idaho 579,581,
416 P.3d 951, 953 (2018). Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for
summary judgment. Rule 56(c) provides that judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions and admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Upon
motion for summary judgment, the Court will liberally construe all controverted facts in favor of
the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences. Arreguin v. Farmers Insurance Company of
Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 461, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008).

If there is no genuine issue of material

fact, there is only a question oflaw over which the Court will exercise free review. Regan v. Owen,
163 Idaho 359,362,413 P.3d 759, 762 (2018).
When summary judgment is based on an Idaho statute, the statute should be applied
according to its plain and unambiguous meaning. In City of Idaho Falls, the Court explained that
a statute must be applied in accordance with its plain and unambiguous meaning; statutory
construction and extra-textual resources should be utilized only if a statute is determined to be
ambiguous. 163 Idaho at 582,416 P.3d at 954, 7 see also McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc.,

7
"'Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent of the [L]egislature shall be given effect without
engaging in statutory construction. The literal words of a statute are the best guide to determining legislative intent.'
I.C. § 73-113. 'Only where the language is ambiguous will this Court look to rules of construction for guidance and
consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations.' Stonebrook Const., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., 152 Idaho 927,
931, 277 P.3d 374, 378 (2012) (citation omitted). Statutory language is not ambiguous "merely because the parties
present differing interpretations to the court." Id. (quoting Payette River, 132 Idaho at 557, 976 P.2d at 483). Rather,
statutory language 'is ambiguous where reasonable minds might differ or be uncertain as to its meaning.' Id." 163
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142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006)(interpreting LC. § 23-808(4)(b) of Idaho's Dram
Shop Act exercising de novo review and determining the term "person" includes minors). As such,
if the Court cannot determine that reasonable minds can differ as to the interpretation of a statute,
the Court must apply the statute as written according to its plain meaning. Id. Only in instances
where a statute is determined to be "ambiguous" should the Court utilize statutory rules of
construction or extra-textual sources to resolve ambiguity. Id.

Idaho's Dram Shop Act is Applicable to This Case and Dispositive

B.

Defendant asserts this Court should conclude that Plaintiffs' action should be dismissed based
on failure to comply with the Act's notice requirement. Plaintiffs raise four (4) separate arguments
they claim support overruling the trial court, which can be summarized as follows: 1) that the Act
is only applicable to cases where furnishing alcohol is "alleged to be the proximate cause of thirdparty injuries" (which Plaintiffs claim is not the case here); 2) that the Act in Idaho only addresses
"a proximate cause of injury" but not all "proximate causes" of injuries; 3) that Idaho precedent
creates a separate cause of action against Dram Shops to which the Act does not apply; and 4) that
principles of statutory construction support Plaintiffs' interpretation of the act. Id. at pp. i and 819. In summary response, Defendant submits a reasoned analysis ofldaho law under each of these
arguments demonstrates, which all demonstrate the trial court's was correct in dismissing
Plaintiffs' action. Each of Plaintiffs' arguments will be addressed in tum.
1.

The Act is Unambiguous and Demonstrates Plaintiffs' Case was Properly Dismissed
In Idaho, pursuant to the plain language of Idaho's Dram Shop Act, a plaintiff who is

seeking to recover for personal injuries against a social host/dram shop must comply with the
provisions and limitations in the statute. Failure to comply is fatal to a plaintiffs claim under the

Idaho at 582,416 P.3d at 954.
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plain language of the Act. See e.g. LC. § 23-808(2) and (3). 8 The express purpose of Idaho's
Dram Shop Act is to limit the liability of social hosts and dram shops for torts and wrongs
committed by intoxicated persons to whom they sold or furnished alcohol. That purpose is plainly
stated within the body of the statute, that the Act was enacted by Idaho's legislature specifically to
"limit dram shop and social host liability[.]" See LC. § 23-808( 1)( emphasis added). In order to
effectuate that goal, the legislature set forth specific narrow circumstances under which personal
injury actions may be pursued against dram shops/social hosts. LC. § 23-808(1) and (3). A plaintiff
must demonstrate that one or both of the two narrow exceptions articulated under LC. § 23808(3)(a) and (b ), applies based on the facts of the case. If the plaintiff cannot so demonstrate they
do not have a valid cause of action against the social host/dram shop defendant. Id. In addition, the
plaintiff must also comply with the Act's mandatory "notice" requirement. See LC. § 23-808(5).
As the plain language of the Act's mandatory notice provision expressly states:
(5) No claim or cause of action may be brought under this section against a person who sold
or otherwise furnished alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person unless the person bringing
the claim or cause of action notified the person who sold or otherwise furnished alcoholic
beverages to the intoxicated person within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the
claim or cause of action arose by certified mail that the claim or cause of action would be
brought.
LC. § 23-808(5)( emphasis added). As that plain and unambiguous language makes clear, the notice
requirement is mandatory. A prospective plaintiff must provide formal notice to a prospective
defendant dram shop/social host within 180-days from the date the claim(s) arose. Timely
compliance with the notice provision LC. § 23-808(5) is a prerequisite to filing a claim and/or
cause of action against a dram shop or social host and failure to comply with the provision is fatal
to a plaintiff or prospective plaintiffs dram shop or social host claim(s)/cause(s) of action. Failure

8

I.C. § 23-808(2) "No claim or cause of action may be brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered
injury, death or other damage caused by an intoxicated person against any person who sold or otherwise furnished
alcoholic beverages to the intoxicated person, except as provided in subsection (3)"(emphasis added); see also I.C. §
23-808(5)("No claim or cause of action may be brought under this section against a person who sold or otherwise
furnished alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person unless[ .. .]")(emphasis added).
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to provide timely notice under the statute requires the trial court dismiss the action as a matter of
law.
In this case, there should be no question that the plain language of I.C. § 23-808(5)
demonstrates its applicability to this case. As Plaintiffs sent their demand letter on December 7,
2017, more than a year had elapsed since the subject incident occurred. It is undeniable the date
Mr. Fell's and Mrs. Fell's claims/causes of action arose was November 26, 2016 as that was the
date of the subject injury and when Mr. Fell was injured, which also gave rise to Mrs. Fell's claim.
Through Plaintiffs' own Complaint, as well as in their demand letter, Plaintiffs alleged that
Defendant's service of alcohol was a proximate cause of the injuries/damages alleged is
demonstrated by both their Complaint and demand letter. R., Vol. 1, pp. pp. 9-11, ,r,r 8, 14 and 2125, Vol. 2, pp. 118-119. 9 As such, under the plain language of the statute, plaintiffs were required
to provide First Street Saloon with notice by no later than 180 days after November 26, 2016, or
by May 25, 2017. As Plaintiffs failed to do so, I.C. § 23-808(5) unambiguously mandates
Plaintiffs' case be dismissed.
Defendant asserts that the Court's analysis can properly end here. However, as Plaintiffs
raise additional arguments in Appellants' Brief, Defendant addresses each below. Although the
Court ultimately need not go beyond the statute's plain language, analysis of the arguments raised
by Plaintiffs and applicable Idaho law only further supports dismissal of Plaintiffs' action.
2. The Act Is Applicable In Any Case Where Service Is Alleged To Be A Proximate Cause,
Or The Facts Indicate It May Have Been A Proximate Cause
In Section 111.C. of Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that nowhere
does Idaho's Dram Shop Act "provide that the limitations and restrictions that it outlines apply to

9 Plaintiffs' demand letter states "First Street Saloon bartenders knew that LaDonna Hall was extremely intoxicated,
to the point where she was a danger to the other patrons[ ... ] Further, First Street Saloon employees were not trained
in how to recognize a potentially dangerous patron, nor were they trained in how to properly refuse service[.]" R.,
Vol. 2, pp. 118-119.
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all cases where the dram shop or social host may be liable or the proximate cause of injuries."

Appellants' Briefat p. 10. However, Appellants' Brief specifies immediately thereafter, Subsection
(1) of the Act applies "when the furnishing of alcoholic beverages may be a proximate cause of
injuries." Id. Defendant-Respondent do not disagree with this statement and would note that this
statement further demonstrates that there is nothing ambiguous about the Act. To the contrary, the
parties agree the Act applies in any case where a social host/dram shop's furnishing of alcoholic
beverages "may be a proximate cause of injuries." Id. Where Plaintiffs diverge in their analysis is
in the argument that the Act does not apply to "all acts by dram shops hosts [sic] that may
proximately cause a third party injury." Id. at p. 11. The problem with Plaintiffs' analysis is in
seeking to alter the pertinent question, which is whether or not the Act is applicable to the case at
bar. Plaintiffs are requesting the Court conduct an analysis on a claim-by-claim basis to determine
whether the Act bars certain claims against a dram shop/social host but not others. There is nothing,
in the plain language of the statute or otherwise, that would support Plaintiffs' interpretation of the
Act and its piecemeal application. Not only is the interpretation not supported, but it seeks to tum
what is generally a simple and straight-forward inquiry, into a complex and convoluted one. In
sum, the plain language of the statute, and the unambiguous intent of the legislature, was for the
application of the Act to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The determination is based on
whether a social host/dram shop's furnishing of alcoholic beverages "may be a proximate cause of
injuries." If Plaintiffs have alleged that the dram shop's furnishing of alcoholic beverages was a
proximate case of the injuries, or where the facts demonstrate the furnishing of alcoholic beverages
may be a proximate cause of the accident, the Act is applicable.
Here, the Act is applicable because the facts in the record supported an argument, and a
jury could have concluded, that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages was a proximate cause of
Plaintiffs' injuries/damages, which is exactly with Plaintiffs' Complaint alleged-that Defendant's
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furnishing of alcoholic beverages was a proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries/damages. See R.,
Vol. 1, pp. 9-10 at ,-r,-r 8, 14 and 21-22; see also Section LC.b., supra. As the intent of the legislature
was to limit dram shop and social host liability, there should be no question that this case falls
within the purview of the Act. LC. § 23-808(1). Thus, Plaintiffs' action is subject to the specific
terms and limitations of Act, including the notice requirement. As Plaintiffs acknowledge they did
not comply with the notice requirement, their action against Defendant is barred. See Section
LC.a., supra. Accordingly, Defendant requests the Court determine that the Act is applicable in
this case, and

the Act is dispositive as Plaintiffs' admittedly failed to comply with LC. § 23-

808(5).
3. Idaho Supreme Court Precedent Demonstrates the Act is Applicable in This Case
Through Sections IILD. of Appellants' Brief, Plaintiffs argue certain Idaho case law
supports their position that the Act is inapplicable to their case. Further, in Section IILE. Plaintiffs
allege a common law claim "created in McGill and Jones that it was the tavernkeeper's breach of
its duty to exercise reasonable care to protect its patrons from reasonably foreseeable injury by
other patrons on the premises that proximately caused the Fells' injury." Appellants' Briefat p. 14;
see also McGill v. Frasure, 117 Idaho 598, 790 P.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1990); see also Jones v.

Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 245 P.3d 1009 (2011). Aside from being contrary and inconsistent with
the plain language of the Act, this argument is also unsupported by a plain reading of the McGill
and Jones cases as neither case alleged service of alcohol as a proximate cause, or otherwise
addressed the intoxication of the third party. Accordingly, as those cases and other pertinent Idaho
case law demonstrate, Plaintiffs' action was properly dismissed under the Act.
a. This Court's Opinions in Jones and McGill Are Distinguishable and Do Not
Provide a Means to Circumvent An Applicable and Mandatory Statute
Through two prior rulings, this Court has indicated that a tort action is available against a
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tavern/dram shop in cases involving criminal assault or battery, where the tavern/dram shop knew
the assailant had violent tendencies. As mentioned in Appellants Brief, and relied upon heavily in
support of their arguments, there are two Supreme Court of Idaho decisions entered in cases where
a plaintiff suffered personal injury as a result of criminal assault/battery and where a bar was
involved (to one degree or another). See McGill v. Frasure, 117 Idaho 598, 599, 790 P.2d 379,
380 (Ct. App. 1990); see also Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 245 P.3d 1009, (2011). Plaintiffs
argue that McGill and Jones created separate tort claims that can be pursued against social
hosts/dram shops, and further that those claims do not require compliance with the Act even when
filing suit against a dram shop. See Appellants' Briefat pp. 14-18. With regard to McGill, Plaintiffs
claim that Court outlined a "separate cause of action from the Dram Shop Act, for the injury of
third persons by bar patrons (where intoxication is not an element) that is wholly unrelated to the
Dram Shop Act." Id. at pp. 14-15. Plaintiffs continue to explain that McGill was filed by a plaintiff
who was physically assaulted against the owner of the bar, arguing the owner "failed in his duty
as a business owner to use reasonable care for her protection." Id. at p. 15 (quoting Id. at 600, 790
P.2d at 381). Plaintiffs also quotes the McGill Court rule that "the tavernkeeper owes [patrons] a
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them from reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands
of other patrons." Id. (quoting Id. at 601, 790 P.2d at 382)(additional citation omitted).
From the outset, it must be noted and emphasized that neither Jones or McGill address facts
where the assailant/perpetrator in question was intoxicated, or that there were any facts at-issue
supporting an argument that the assailant's intoxication and/or the tavern's service of the assailant
was a proximate cause. In McGill, the plaintiffs allegations against the defendant tavernkeeper
was based entirely on the argument that he "negligently failed in his duty as a business owner to
use reasonable care for her protection." Id. at 599, 790 P.2d at 380. As such, the plaintiffs
allegations related solely to the defendant's failure to use reasonable care to protect her from
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harm/assault, not that the service of the assailant was in any way a proximate cause of the
injuries/damages. Moreover, Idaho's Dram Shop is not mentioned in the McGill opinion, which is
likely reflective of the fact that alcohol service/intoxication was not alleged as a cause at-issue, or
even discussed in the case. As such, the McGill case is not only highly distinguishable from the
instant case but offers no meaningful insight into the issue( s) before the Court as Plaintiffs'
specifically alleged that service of alcohol was a proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries/damages.
The Jones case limited the scope and applicability of McGill, and although it addressed
somewhat similar facts/circumstances, reached a result favorable to the tavern/defendant. The case
also revolved around a criminal assault, which occurred outside of a tavern in Lewiston, Idaho
where a patron was outside of the establishment and was attached by a random, unidentified
assailant. Jones, 150 Idaho at 259, 245 P.3d at 1011. The injured patron filed suit making a
negligence claim against the tavern, but ultimately the Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal
because the attack by an unknown assailant was not foreseeable. Id. Regarding the issue here, the
applicability of the Act, the Jones Court importantly included the following footnote:
The Appellants argued before the district court that a duty was owed by Boomers to Mr.
Jones under the Dram Shop Act, LC. § 23-808(3)(b ). The district court held that the Dram
Shop Act was inapplicable because the Appellants had failed to assert any facts that would
show "(1) that the assailant had been a patron of Boomers and (2) that Boomers' employees
furnished alcoholic beverages to the assailant when they knew or should have reasonably
known that the assailant was obviously intoxicated" as required under the Act. Appellants
make no argument in their briefs to this Court that the district court was incorrect in its
conclusion and therefore the Dram Shop Act is not considered here.
Id. Thus, as was alluded to by the Jones Court, in cases where an intoxicated assailant was a patron

of a bar/tavern in question the bar/tavern did in fact sell/furnish alcoholic beverages to the assailant,
and the service of alcohol/intoxication of the assailant may be a proximate cause, the Act applies
to the negligence claim. 10 In other words, when coupled with the plain language of the Act, when

10

See also LC. § 23-808(5)("[n]o claim or cause of action may be brought [ ... ] unless the person bringing the
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the service of alcohol is alleged to be a proximate cause of a plaintiffs injuries/damages resulting
from the conduct of an intoxicated patron, the Act and all of its requirements and limitations apply.
Accordingly, failure to comply with the notice requirement under LC.§ 28-808(5) in an applicable
case operates as a total bar to the action.
Here, there should be no question that the Act applies, and a plain reading of McGill and
Jones only further supports that conclusion. That conclusion can be reached based on the express

allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint alone, and what factual circumstances they allege Defendant
should be held responsible for. See R., Vol. 1, pp. 9-10 at ,r,r 8, 14 and 21-22. Plaintiffs elected to
sue Defendant based on the conduct of an intoxicated third-party and patron of the bar who was
served by Defendant throughout the night in question. Id. at p. 9 at ,r 8 ("Another patron at the Bar,
[Ms.] Hall, had been drinking heavily throughout the evening of November 26, 2017 [sic].") As
part of their Complaint, Plaintiffs unquestionably alleged that intoxication/inebriation was a part
of the equation in the injuries sustained. Id. at ,r 22 ("[Defendant] breached its duty to [Plaintiffs]
by failing to cease service to [Ms.] Hall and/or remove her from Bar premises.") Moreover, there
is no question that the details surrounding Defendant's service of Ms. Hall were subject to
continuous and heavy scrutiny throughout discovery, and the implication (if not outright
allegation) was Defendant had overserved Ms. Hall when she should have been cut off. See Section
I.C.b. supra.
In any event, because the assailant was a patron of Defendant and she was being served on
the night in question, there should be no question that the service of alcohol may have been a
proximate cause, and certainly was alleged by Plaintiffs to have been a proximate cause of the
injury/damage issue. Accordingly, this case is not akin to McGill as alcohol has been specifically

claim or cause of action notified the person who sold or otherwise furnished alcoholic beverages [.]")(emphasis
added)
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pled as a proximate cause, and therefore is precisely the type of action that the Act was enacted to
address. As such, even if it could be successfully argued that Plaintiffs have alleged a valid
common law negligence claim (which Defendant disputed both to the trial court and in this brief
below) the claim is subject to the Act and it's notice requirement as service is a fundamental theory
of their case. To allow Plaintiffs to pursue a common law claim would enable them to circumvent
the mandatory provisions of an unambiguous and directly applicable statute. That is particularly
true when taken in conjunction with the express purpose of the Act to limit dram shop liability and
further to require individuals be responsible for their own actions. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' action
should be dismissed for failure to comply with LC. § 23-808(5).
b. Additional Idaho Precedent Supports the Applicability of the Act Here
Although the dispositive nature of the notice requirement can be inferred from the plain
language of the Act, this Court has explicitly articulated that the notice requirement, among other
provisions in the Act, operate and are construed to limit social host/dram shop liability. Idaho

Dept. ofLabor v. Sunset Marts, Inc., 140 Idaho 207,211, 91 P.3d 1111, 1115 (2004). As the Sunset
Marts Court explained:
[the Act] limits liability by stating the circumstances under which the person who sells or
otherwise furnishes alcoholic beverages can be held liable for damages caused the
intoxicated person; by providing that neither the intoxicated person, to whom the alcoholic
beverages were sold or furnished, nor a passenger in an automobile driven by an intoxicated
person has a cause of action under the Dram Shop Act; and by requiring that the person
who sold or otherwise furnished alcoholic beverages to the intoxicated person be given
notice within 180 days after the cause of action arose.

Idaho Dept. of Labor v. Sunset Marts, Inc., 140 Idaho 207, 211, 91 P.3d 1111, 1115
(Idaho,2004)(citing LC. 23 § 808 (3)-(5)(emphasis added)). The Sunset Marts case also provided
a brief history of dram shop liability, noting that the Court originally created a "no liability" rule
through its decision in Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389 (1969). That rule was later overruled in

Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980), which created liability in the context of
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service to minors and the Court expanded the rule to dram shops serving obviously intoxicated
adults in Bergman v. Henry, 115 Idaho 259, 766 P.2d 729 (1988). The Court concludes its
recitation with the enactment of the Act, which codified the circumstances, guidelines and
limitations applicable to cases where the vending of intoxicants may be a proximate cause of
damage based on the conduct of a consumer/customer. Id. Finally, the Court specifies that the
"Dram Shop Act addresses proximate cause, not duty or breach of duty." Id. Accordingly, the

Sunset Marts case explained the Act applies in all cases where a plaintiff seeks to recover monetary
damages against a dram shop or social host based on personal injuries caused by the conduct of an
intoxicated person and where the service of alcohol may be a proximate cause.
The Act was interpreted by the Court where a student at the University of Idaho and
member of a sorority and was injured from falling out of a window after becoming intoxicated at
a fraternity function. Coughlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,393. 987 P.2d 300,305
(1999). The Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs case against the fraternity who
served her the alcohol as "LC. 23-808(4)(a) prevents [plaintiff] from recovering from the providers
of alcohol in this case." Id. The plaintiff did not challenge the trial court's reading or application
of the Act's plain language, but instead challenged its constitutionality. Id. In undertaking its
analysis, the Coughlin Court had occasion to discuss the Act's purpose, which it explained:
"limits dram shop liability to those persons who are innocently injured as a result of the negligent
provision of alcohol." Id. at 396, 987 P.2d at 308. Further, it stated that the ruling of the trial court
served the purpose and policies underlying the statute because "[p ]rohibiting persons who
become intoxicated from

recovermg

from

negligent

providers

of

alcohol

both

limits dram shop and social host liability and discourages irresponsible consumption of alcohol."

Id. at 397, 987 P.2d at 309. Similar to the provision under LC. § 23-808(5), the Court concluded
that "LC. § 23-808(4) is a statutory bar to an action by an intoxicated person against the provider
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of alcohol." Id. Accordingly, the plaintiffs entire case was properly dismissed as required by the
plain terms of the Act.
Here, the Sunset and Coughlin cases provide context for dram shop liability, and
demonstrate that under the current state of the law the Act must be applied to this action and the
notice requirement is a total statutory bar to Plaintiffs' case. Ultimately it makes no difference
what theory/theories Plaintiffs are pursuing against the First Street Saloon to seek recovery for
personal injuries caused by Ms. Hall during the subject incident; as indicated by the plain language
of the Act and relevant case law, including that set forth by the Jones Court, Plaintiffs were
required to comply with the notice requirement before filing suit. Plaintiffs failure to do so is
entirely dispositive and requires that their case be dismissed with prejudice as a matter of law.
4. Even Assuming The Court Determined the Act is Ambiguous Proper Consideration of The
Act's Legislative History and/or Public Policy Only Further Support Dismissal
Assuming, arguendo, the Court decided to analyze the legislative history to interpret the
Act, such analysis only further supports affirming the trial court's decision as the case must be
dismissed for failure to comply with the mandatory notice requirement under LC. § 23-808(5).

a. Legislative History Supports Dismissal
There are several documents that are publicly available at the Idaho Legislative Research
Library that provide significant insight into the intent of the legislature as to what specifically the
Act was intended to cover and demonstrating it act to bar this case. Specifically, the following are
all highly instructive and have been attached as Addendums to this Brief for the Court's
consideration: Statement of Purpose to Senate Bill No. 1439 (that would be enacted as LC. § 23808)(attached as Addendum 1); Meeting Minutes from the House of Representatives Commerce,
Industry and Tourism Committee meeting dated March 25, 1986 (attached as Addendum 2); the
Minutes from the Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee meeting dated March 7, 1986 ( attached

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 22

as Addendum 3); and the Meeting Minutes from two separate meetings of the Legislative Counsel
Committee on Alcoholic Beverages, Subcommittee on Licensing dated August 12, 1985
(Addendum 4) and dated December 9, 1985 (Addendum 5)(please note that Addendum 4 and 5
only include the select pages where alcohol seller liability/a prospective dram-shop act was
discussed). As the Statement of Purpose explicitly states, the legislature's purpose behind drafting
and enacting the bill is to state "the circumstances under which the furnisher may be held
responsible for the actions of the consumer[.]" See Addendum 1. As such, the purpose of the Act
expressly indicates it governs all circumstances when a dram shop may be responsible for the

actions of a consumer, and indicates its applicability in all cases where a plaintiff seeks to hold a
dram shop responsible for the injury causing conduct of a customer. The notice requirement is also
addressed in similarly broad but specific terms, indicating the Act "provides that a person filing a
claim must notify the person who sold or furnished the beverage alcohol within 120 days from the
date the incident occurred." Id. There can be no doubt as to the legislature's intent for the notice
requirement to be a prerequisite to filing suit in any case covered by the Act.
With regard to the Meeting Minutes from the House of Representatives Commerce,
Industry and Tourism Committee, the minutes provide further context regarding the intent and
purpose behind the Act. Addendum 2. The minutes note the Act's scope is "relating to the
furnishing of alcoholic beverages; to limit certain dram shop and social host liability, and to

provide when a cause of action may be brought[.]" Id. (emphasis added and capitalization
removed). The minutes then continue to note that it was "explained to the committee that the basic
function of this measure is to try to make individuals responsible for their own actions." Id. It then
further explained what would be specifically articulated in the statute, that the furnisher of alcohol
"may be liable under certain circumstances, if they furnish alcohol to a minor or to an obviously
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intoxicated person." Id. After the discussion concluded, Representative Stone made a motion to
send SB 1439 to the senate floor with a "do pass" recommendation, which was seconded and the
motion carried. Id.
Further, the Act is addressed briefly in the Minutes from the Senate Judiciary and Rules
Committee dated March 7, 1986. See Addendum 3. As titled in the Minutes, the Act is explained
as "[p ]rohibiting certain dram shop/social host liability[.]" Id. Finally, the Legislative Counsel
Committee on Alcoholic Beverages Minutes notes that an "anti-dram shop" liability provision
would address insurance rates that had gone "through the roof' and that ""[ s]ociety has gone
overboard on a person's ability to sue and that problem needs to be addressed." Addendum 4 at p.
2. It was further indicated "[t]here is a lot of feeling there must be some adult responsibility on the
part of the consumer." Id. Finally, the Minutes from the meeting dated December 9, 1985 discusses
the bill that would become the Act, and notes "Chapter 3 deals with regulation and enforcement
and prohibits dram shop liability in most cases." See Addendum 5 (emphasis added). As such, in
consideration of Addendums 1-5, it is apparent the Act was intended to expressly limit the liability
of sellers/furnishers of alcohol where liability is premised on the conduct of an intoxicated thirdparty consumer (except in limited circumstances and when the notice provision is complied with)
and primarily place liability squarely with the intoxicated person who actually committed the
conduct in question. See Addendum 1 (Purpose to set forth "the circumstances under which the
furnisher may be held responsible for the actions of the consumer[.]")
b. Public Policy and Express Purpose of the Act Support Dismissal
Based on the express language of Idaho's Dram Shop Act, and the legislative history, there
are three public policy purposes that underlie the statute: 1) to limit the liability of dramshops/providers of alcohol; 2) to enable injured persons to file lawsuits under appropriate
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circumstances as set forth by the statute; and 3) to hold that individuals are responsible for their
own actions and therefore that personal injury lawsuits against dram-shops only be permitted in
certain limited circumstances and when certain prerequisites are met. See LC. § 23-808; see also
Addendums 1-4. Furthermore, pursuant to the express purpose set forth within the act itself, the

legislature's intent in an acting the statute was to "limit dram shop and social host liability". LC.
§ 23-808(1). There is no question that each of the public policy considerations, and the express
intent of the legislature articulated in the act itself, all support the conclusion that the Act and its
requirements/limitations are applicable to this case.
As the notice requirement was included expressly to promote those policies and the
Legislature's intent, and as it is a key component in ensuring the Acts effectiveness and
enforceability, the failure to comply by a plaintiff must result in outright dismissal of their case.
That conclusion is also consistent with the Statement of Purpose, which explained the "legislation
states the circumstances under which the furnisher may be held responsible for the actions of the
consumer[. ]"Addendum 1. That statement does not discuss the sale of alcohol, it specifies that the
Act codifies when a seller of alcohol may be held responsible for the consumers "actions" and in
the next sentence specifies any person filing a claim "must notify" the alcohol seller "within 120
days from the date the incident occurred." Id.; see also LC.§ 23-808(5). Accordingly, to the extent
there is any possible ambiguity or cause for confusion, that language expressly clarifies the
legislature's intent, and the manner in which the Act should be applied in this case. Such ruling
would be consistent with the purpose of the Act as it would limit "dram shop and social host
liability", would be consistent with public policy of individuals being held responsible for their
own actions and further ensuring that only plaintiffs who comply with the Act will be permitted to
pursue a seller of alcohol. Such a ruling avoids inconsistency, clarifies the applicability of the
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 25

statute and strengthens the statute's enforceability in a manner consistent with the express purpose
and public policy considerations. Further, Defendant's proposed rule would also serve the policies
and principles sought to be upheld by Idaho law. That includes a general affirmation that litigants
should be required to comply with the rule of law, the promotion of clarity and uniformity of the
law by the judiciary, and the promotion of judicial economy through encouragement of only
meritorious claims to be filed where all statutory prerequisites are met.
On the other hand, the rule Plaintiffs argue for would be in direct opposition to the Act's
express purpose and contrary to the pertinent public policy considerations discussed above. In
effect, Plaintiffs' proposed rule would encourage prospective plaintiffs who fail to timely comply
with the Act's notice requirement to carefully draft their complaint in a manner that avoids making
allegations relating to the sale of alcohol. Plaintiffs' proposed rule would make such conduct
potentially successful, even in cases where the facts and circumstances demonstrates the action
was intended to be subject to the Act. That rule would effectively provide a means for future
plaintiffs to circumvent the Act and its notice requirement, which was expressly intended to be a
mandatory prerequisite to a plaintiffs ability to file suit. Plaintiffs' proposed rule would have a
direct negative impact on alcohol sellers/prospective defendants in the future, would significantly
weaken the Act and hamper its enforceability, and would negatively impact Idaho courts having
to address actions where the notice requirement and/or other prerequisites have not been complied
with. Accordingly, the Court should determine the Act applies in this case, and further that it
applies in all personal injury cases (whether pied as common law negligence or otherwise) where
service of alcohol is alleged to be or may be a proximate cause. Thus, Defendant requests the Court
determine Plaintiffs' case should be properly dismissed based on proper analysis ofldaho law, and
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further because that conclusion is consistent with the express intent of the legislature and promotes
all applicable public policy considerations.
C.

Assuming Arguendo the Court Determines the Act is Not Dispositive, Defendant
Asserts as a Preliminary Matter the Trial Court Erred in Overruling Defendant's
Motion to Strike
Defendant asserts the Court's analysis can end through its review of the analysis discussed

in Section III.C., supra. However, assuming for the sake of argument and discussion, that the Court
were to decide not to affirm the trial court's decision on that basis, it should still be affirmed for
the reason(s) articulated in Section III.D., infra. As a preliminary matter, Defendant asks the Court
review the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Strike Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
Declaration of Angela Burke, which is pursued here as an additional issue on appeal in accordance
with I.A.R. 15(a). See also I.A.R. 34(b)(4). Although a trial court's summary judgment decision
is subject to de novo review, evidentiary matters are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 11
With regard to evidentiary objections or motion(s) to strike filed in a summary judgment
proceeding, such issues should be addressed as preliminary matters before a Court's consideration
of the substantive issues raised through a motion for summary judgment. Gem State Ins. Co. v.
Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 14, 175 P.3d 172, 176 (2007)(quoting Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807,

11 A non-dispositive evidentiary ruling may be decided on appeal, and as is the case of the trial court's consideration
of such issues, evidentiary matters are preliminary issues that should be ruled on prior to consideration of the summary
judgment motion. An evidentiary matter should be addressed at the outset as it "is a threshold matter that is distinct
from whether the testimony raises genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment." Arregui
v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 804, 291 P.3d 1000, 1003 (2012). In reviewing a trial court's evidentiary rulings
on appeal, the Court utilizes the abuse of discretion standard. When reviewing the trial court's decision for an abuse
of discretion, the Court engages in a three-part inquiry: "( 1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason."
Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169, 173, 335 P.3d 14, 18 (2014)(quoting McDaniel v. Inland Nw. Renal Care Grp.Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219, 221-22, 159 P.3d 856, 858-59 (2007)).
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811, 979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999)(additional citation omitted)(Evidentiary issues should be
addressed "before proceeding to the ultimate issue, whether summary judgment is appropriate.")
Regarding sworn statements, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) states, in pertinent part:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
I.R.C.P. 56(e). Although a trial court draws inferences in favor of non-moving parties on summary
judgment, "[t]he liberal construction and reasonable inferences standard does not apply, however,
when

deciding

whether

or

not

testimony

offered

in

connection

with

a

motion

for summary judgment is admissible." Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160,
163, 45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002). That requires the Court determine whether the affidavit presents
facts, which "if taken as true, would render the testimony of that witness admissible." Id.
Accordingly the affidavit must be admissible under Idaho's Rules of Evidence and contain
sufficient factual information that would render the testimony admissible at trial. Gem State Ins.
Co, 145 Idaho at 15, 175 P.3d at 177. This Court has held that Rule 56(e)'s "requirements 'are not

satisfied by an affidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by personal
knowledge." Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC. v. MacDonald, 162 Idaho 228,231,395 P.3d 1261,
1264 (2017)(quoting State v. Shama Res. Ltd. P'ship, 127 Idaho 267, 271, 899 P.2d 977, 981
(1995)). Foundational requirements underlying admissibility of documents for consideration by a
trial court aim to alleviate "concerns about accuracy and authenticity." Id. at 233, 395 P.3d at 1266.
Here, the Court should conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to strike
paragraphs 3 and 4 from the Declaration of Angela Burke. As to Paragraph 3, the statement lacks
adequate foundation, in addition to being conclusory and speculative. As to the first basis, Ms.
Burke has offered no foundation to indicate her relationship with Ms. Hall (if any), has not
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indicated the date on which these statements were made (or even a general time frame), does not
indicate who Ms. Hall was speaking to when she was making these statements, how she was able
to overhear these statement and perhaps most importantly she does not identify the "First Street
Saloon's bartender". See R. Vol. 3, p. 242 at i-f 3. She further makes a conclusory and speculative
statement that Ms. Hall made such declarations 10-15 times, without indicating specific
information regarding any of the alleged instances when these declarations were allegedly made
by Ms. Hall. Id. Additionally, Ms. Burke speculates/concludes the unidentified "bartender" was
"within earshot" when some of these declarations were purportedly made, again providing no
further information or detail to provide foundation for such a claim. Id.

The trial court denied

Defendant's Motion to Strike, and concluded that "if there's a foundational issue to it, it goes to
the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility." Tr., Vol. 1, p. 10 at 11. 18-23. The trial court also
overruled the objections the statement was conclusory and speculative. Id. at pp. 10-11 at 11. 2325 and 1-7.- However, that ruling ignores the fact that Ms. Burke conclusively and speculatively
states that the purported statements by Ms. Hall would "be made within earshot the [sic] First
Street Saloon bartender". R. Vol. 3, p. 242 at

,r 3.

As Ms. Burke has not identified any of the

bartender(s) purportedly "within ear shot" there is no way to verify the accuracy of the statement,
no less determine what, if anything, such bartender(s) actually heard. Id. As an Affidavit provided
on summary judgment where the witness is not subject to cross-examination must contain adequate
foundation prior to being considered by the trial court. Defendant requests this Court determine
the trial court's denial of Defendant's objection to Paragraph 3 was an abuse of discretion.
Defendant also requests the Court determine the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Defendant's Motion to Strike Paragraph 4 of Ms. Burke's Declaration as there should be no
question it contains inadmissible hearsay and that it lacks adequate foundation. As to the former
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objection raised by Defendant, what Ms. Burke (the declarant) purportedly told to "First Street
Saloon's bartender" is hearsay, and further is used by Plaintiff to prove the truth of the matter
asserted (not only that Defendant had some knowledge/notice with regard to alleged "dangerous
propensities" of Ms. Hall but as a basis to alleged Ms. Hall in fact had such propensities that
Defendant should be aware of). See I.R.E. 801 (c)(l)-(2)(hearsay is a "statement that: (1) the
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in that statement.") As to Defendant's objection
based on lack of foundation, similar to Paragraph 3, Ms. Burke does not identify the individual she
purportedly spoke with, but simply claims she made this statement about Ms. Hall to a "female
bartender" at the First Street Saloon. R., Vol. 3, p. 243 at ,r 4. No further information is provided
(other than that she claims to have made the statement "4-6 months prior" to the subject incident)
that provides Defendant or the Court any meaningful way to ascertain the validity or accuracy of
that statement. Id. The identity of the person on the other end of this purported statement is an
essential foundational component when it is sought to be utilized as a basis for proving Ms. Hall
has some dangerous propensities and/or that Defendant had some knowledge of them. Without
that crucial information, there is no basis to determine the validity of this statement, which is
without even addressing the fact that Ms. Burke has not addressed the basis for making such
statement, how she knows Ms. Hall "likes to start fights" or "can be a problem", or otherwise the
foundational basis that compelled her to make this "statement". In ruling on Defendant's Motion
to Strike Paragraph 4, the Court did not provide a basis for denying the motion/overruling the
objection but concluded"[ a]nd Paragraph 4 I'm not really seeing a problem with either. So I think
that evidence comes in." Tr., Vol. 1, p. 11 at 11. 9-13. Although the trial court clarified that it did
not believe the statements were dispositive as to any issue, or that it somehow establishes someone
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was put on notice "because she can't testify to that", evidentiary decisions are to be made as
threshold matters aside from the summary judgment decision. Accordingly, Defendant requests
the Court determine the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's Motion to Strike.
D.

AssumingArguendo the Court Determines the Act is Not Dispositive Plaintiffs' Action
Should Still be Dismissed and the Trial Court's Decision Affirmed Based on the
Alternative Arguments Raised in Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion

Defendant asserts that the proper conclusion to be reached by the Court is articulated above
based on proper analysis and application of Idaho's Dram Shop Act to the facts of this case.
However, as that was not the only argument raised, briefed and argued before the trial court, it is
also not the sole basis upon which the dismissal can be affirmed. Plaintiffs' action can also be
dismissed as Defendant did not owe a legally cognizable duty and/or based on Plaintiffs' bad faith
misconduct in bribing a material witness was sufficiently egregious to support dismissal. As both
issues provide a basis to affirm the trial court's decision, both will be addressed separately in tum.
1. General Principles of Law Applicable to Negligence Claims Including Those Articulated
in McGill and Jones Provide the First Alternative Basis to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Action.
Although the trial court did not address the issue below, as it dismissed Plaintiffs' case
based on their failure to comply with the notice requirement under I.C. § 23-808(5), the dismissal
of Plaintiffs case can also be affirmed based on Plaintiffs' failure to plead a valid negligence claim
that survives summary judgment. In a negligence action the plaintiff must establish the following
elements: "(1) a duty recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard
of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and
the resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage." Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Co., 136
Idaho 648, 650, 39 P.3d 588, 590 (2001) (additional citation omitted). "No liability exists under
the law of torts unless the person from whom relief is sought owed a duty to the allegedly injured
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party." Jones, 150 Idaho at 260, 245 P.3d at 1012.
Thus, the threshold question in a negligence action is whether the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty, the determination of which is a question of law to be decided by the court.
Bramwell, 136 Idaho at 650, 39 P.3d at 590 (citing Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985

P .2d 669, 672 ( 1999)). As a general rule, each person has a duty to use ordinary care to "prevent
unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others."

Sharp v. W.H Moore Inc., 118 Idaho 297,

300, 796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990). It is also clear, however, "that not every person or entity owes a
tort duty to everyone else in all circumstances." Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 393-94, 179 P.3d
352, 356-57 (Ct. App. 2008). Generally an individual or entity does not owe an affirmative duty
to protect someone or prevent some harm, except in two limited sets of circumstances when an
affirmative duty to aid or protect might be imposed upon a party. Coughlin, 133 Idaho at 400-01,
987 P .2d at 312-13.

First, if a "special relationship" exists between the parties or; second, if there

an "assumed duty" based on a voluntary undertaking. Id. Even where there may be a special
relationship, in the context of a claim against a personal injury claim filed against an Idaho business
based on the conduct of a third-party, plaintiff must demonstrate the "risk of harm" in question
was foreseeable. Id. at 400, 987 P.2d at 312. Summary judgment may be granted if plaintiff fails
to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning the general risk of
harm." Caldwell v. Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc., 132 Idaho 120, 125, 968 P.2d 215, 220 (1998). If a
plaintiffs claim specifically arises from personal injuries sustained in a criminal assault, it must
be demonstrated that such risk of harm was foreseeable. This arises under principle "every person,
in the conduct of his or her business, has a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent unreasonable,
foreseeable risks of harm to others." Turpen, 133 Idaho at 247, 985 P.2d at 672.
For a criminal assault to be foreseeable, plaintiff must show defendant had knowledge of
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propensity for violence by the assailant. In McGill, which discussed these principles in the context
of a defendant bar/tavern, the Court of Appeals articulated the determination of whether a duty
exists to protect a patron from harm by an assailant is "whether the tavernkeeper knew or should
have known of [assailant's] allegedly dangerous propensity." 117 Idaho at 601, 790 P .2d at 3 82. 12
The Jones Court elaborated on the rule, explaining a plaintiff must demonstrate the tavern had
knowledge of the "assailant's violent propensities" or the negligence claim mist fail as a matter of
law. 150 Idaho at 260, 245 P.3d at 1012. More concisely stated, in must be determined whether
the plaintiff has made a factual showing to demonstrate that "the tavern had knowledge that the
specific patron who committed the assault had a propensity for violence." Id. at 257,260,245 P.3d
at 1012 (citing McGill, 117 Idaho at 601, 790 P.2d at 382). The Jones Court further specified this
rule applies even if the injured party in question was a patron of the tavern and was on the premises
when the assault occurred because Idaho courts do not otherwise consider violent criminal assault
foreseeable. Id. Without an appropriate showing that defendant had specific knowledge of an
assailant's "violent propensities", the plaintiffs negligence claim must be dismissed. Id.
In this case, there did not exist any legally cognizable duty that First Street Saloon owed to
Plaintiffs to protect them from harm because it was unforeseeable that Mr. Fell would be criminally
assaulted by Ms. Hall. There exists no genuine issue of fact demonstrating Defendant had any
knowledge that Ms. Hall had any "violent propensities". See Section I.C.b., supra. To the contrary,
the facts in the record demonstrate that the employees with the tavern had never witnessed Ms.

12

Our research has yielded no direct Idaho precedent concerning the duty a tavernkeeper owes his patrons to protect
them from criminal assaults or intentional misconduct by third parties. Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have
ruled on this issue and have determined that while not an insurer of safety of his patrons, the tavernkeeper owes them
a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them from reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands of other patrons.
Annot., Tavernkeeper-Patron Assault 43 A.LR.4th 281 (1986). This is also in accord with the principles enunciated
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 314A, 344 (1965).
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Hall ever engage in any verbal or physical altercations or otherwise witness her engaging in any
activity that would make her criminal assault foreseeable and create an affirmative duty of care.
Id. As such, Plaintiffs' claims of negligence must be dismissed because the criminal assault by Ms.

Hall was not reasonably foreseeable as all of the employees of the First Street Saloon have
uniformly testified they had no knowledge that Ms. Hall had any "dangerous propensity". Id. As
such, there exists no genuine issue of material fact as to the element of whether Defendant owed
Plaintiffs a duty, as they did not Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed as a matter oflaw.
2. Mr. Fell's Bad Faith Misconduct Provides the Second Alternative Basis to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Action.
When a party to a lawsuit engages in witness tampering, or other willful and/or highly
culpable and serious conduct, the dismissal of an action can be an appropriate decision by the
Court. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in a recent case. When
discussing a Court's power to address misconduct, it stated that "Apart from the discovery rule
[allowing for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 37] , a court has the inherent authority to manage
judicial proceedings and to regulate the conduct of those appearing before it, and pursuant to that
authority may impose appropriate sanctions to penalize and discourage misconduct." Ramirez v.
T&H Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2016)(citing See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501

U.S. 32, 46-50, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2134-36, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991); see also Secrease v. Western &
Southern Life Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 2015)("[d]ismissal [pursuant to the court's

inherent authority] can be appropriate when the plaintiff has abused the judicial process by seeking
relief based on information that the plaintiff knows is false."). The Ramirez Court further
elaborated on when such an exercise of the Court's inherent power is appropriate; it stated:
The exercise of either power requires the court to find that the responsible party acted or
failed to act with a degree of culpability that exceeds simple inadvertence or mistake before
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it may choose dismissal as a sanction for discovery violations. Any sanctions imposed
pursuant to the court's inherent authority must be premised on a finding that the culpable
party willfully abused the judicial process or otherwise conducted the litigation in bad faith
845 F.3d at 776. The Court also indicated that the proper standard to be considered by the Court
when determining whether a party's misconduct merits a sanction as severe as dismissal is the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard as opposed to the more onerous "clear and convincing"
standard. Id. In explaining its reasoning the Court emphasized the nature of civil litigation, and
interests that are at stake. Ramirez, 845 F .3d at 778-79 .13 The Court finally explained that the
labels placed on the wrongful conduct of the party (i.e. fraud, bad faith, quasi-criminal misconduct
fault, etc.) are irrelevant because ultimately the case at issue is "a civil suit between private
litigants" where monetary damages are what is at stake, and thus reiterated that "the facts
underlying a district court's decision to dismiss the suit or enter a default judgment as a sanction
under Rule 37 or the court's inherent authority need only be established by a preponderance of the
evidence." Id. at 781. As such, if a preponderance of the evidence shows a party engaged in willful
misconduct (i.e. witness tampering as addressed by Ramirez) a Court may utilize its inherent
authority to dismiss the party's case with prejudice. Id.
Here, as Mr. Fell himself has admitted he offered a key witness in this case a specific
monetary sum (two months worth ofrent) in exchange for favorable testimony. See Section I.C.c.,

13

As in most civil suits between private parties, what is at stake in this suit is money (Ramirez did not ask for equitable
relief), and thus a factual error in the determination of the merits of the case exposes both parties to the same type and
magnitude ofrisk-the loss or gain of the damages that Ramirez seeks. The same is true with respect to the imposition
of sanctions. Nothing about the nature of sanctions in a civil case places one party or the other in a unique position:
either party may be sanctioned for its misconduct, and either might lose the right to present its case if the court decides
to enter an adverse judgment as a sanction, as occurred here. (Rule 37(b)(2)(A) (v) and (vi) authorizes both the
dismissal of the action and the entry of a default judgment against the offending plaintiff or defendant; and the court's
inherent power to sanction misconduct is likewise symmetrical[.] Ramirez, 845 F.3d at 778-79 (emphasis added).
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supra. Making the situation more problematic, is that Mr. Fell apparently intended to utilize the

money he believed he would obtain from Defendant's insurance provider (utilizing the story he is
requesting Ms. Welker to "testify" to) as the message indicates he would pay her when "the money
comes in" and he testified at his deposition that the purpose/one of the purposes behind the
statement was to inform Ms. Welker that he was not tying to go after "Wes and Roxanne" (the
members/owners of the Fat Smitty's, LLC) but instead that Mr. Fell was trying to "go
after"/attempt to recover from Defendant's property insurance. Id.; see also S. Fell Deposition, R.,
Vol. 1, pp. 52 and 53, 11. 59:8-60:14 and 62:1-5. Although Mr. Fell attempted to couch what he did
at his deposition in terms of asking Ms. Welker to be "honest" and that he was seeking her "honest
cooperation", as set forth in the quoted testimony set forth in Section II above, Mr. Fell was asking
Ms. Welker to tell a certain story that he believed was beneficial to his case and offered her two
months worth of rent from the insurance proceeds in exchange for her providing testimony to that
effect. See Id. at p. 53, 11. 62:1-21. It must also be noted that during her deposition Ms. Welker
expressly denied ever telling anyone a story that is inconsistent with the testimony she provided at
her deposition. Id. at p. 68, 11. 90: 1-22.
Based on Mr. Fell's testimony, his conduct was willful and/or not conducted in good faith
showing due respect for the American justice system. It was an attempted bribe for favorable
testimony. His conduct is certainly sufficient to warrant dismissal under the standard articulated
by Ramierez. In fact, as Ramirez emphasized prior decisions by the Seventh Circuit upholding
dismissal sanctions determined there was some "willfulness, bad faith" or "fault" with the latter
standard only requiring a determination that the "the sanctioned party was guilty of' extraordinarily
poor judgment' or 'gross negligence' rather than mere 'mistake or carelessness."' 845 F.3d at 776.
Mr. Fell's conduct unquestionably rises above the level of mistake or carelessness.
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Plaintiffs claim Mr. Fell's conduct was not done in bad faith because he was trying to get
Ms. Welker to "tell the truth". However, an offer of money for favorable testimony cannot be
argued to be done in "good faith" and certainly does not provide a legitimate justification or excuse
for Mr. Fell's actions. One does not pay (i.e. bribe) a witness to tell the truth. That much is already
required by the law. Perjury laws, both in Idaho and across the nation, have been codified for this
precise reason and Idaho's statute criminalizing perjury provides more than sufficient reason to
discourage witnesses from offering untruthful testimony. See. LC. 18 § 5401, et seq. With that
statute in place, there exists no need for Mr. Fell to further encourage Ms. Welker-Mate to "tell the
truth" and certainly no reason to offer a financial incentive for doing so, except for reasons that are
self-serving. Accordingly, Defendant requests the Court determine the facts demonstrate that Mr.
Fell's actions were done in bad faith as they represent a completely self-serving effort to procure
favorable testimony by offering a witness money in exchange for that testimony. Thus, in
accordance with Ramirez and other pertinent principles of law, this bad faith misconduct provides
an additional alternative basis for the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' case as a matter oflaw. In any
event, the trial court's decision should be affirmed.

E.

Defendant Is Entitled To Costs And Fees On Appeal.
Defendant respectfully requests the Court award attorney fees and costs incurred for this

appeal, which Defendant requests pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 35(b)(5), 40, and 41(a), Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2), and Idaho Code§ 12-121. Under Idaho Appellate Rule 40, costs
"shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or
order of the Court."

Defendant is unaware of any other provision of law that would forbid his

recovery of costs should he prevail on appeal.
Court award his costs as the prevailing party.
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Accordingly, Defendant respectfully requests this

Attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 (a) and Idaho Code §
12-121 when an appeal is brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Durrant v.
Christiansen, 117 Idaho 70, 785 P.2d 634 (1990). For instance, in Durrant, an award of attorney

fees was justified "where the plaintiffs presented no persuasive argument in support of the
contention that the district court ... abused its discretion or misapplied the law[.]" Id.

An award

of fees is appropriate as Plaintiffs' arguments lack legal and/or factual foundation, and are
presented without persuasive argument, because the Act is unquestionably applies based on a plain
reading of its provisions and Plaintiffs' own Complaint, which expressly alleged over-serving as
a proximate cause. See R., Vol. 1, pp. 9-10 at ,r,r 8, 14 and 21-22.

Therefore, attorney fees should

be awarded to Defendant pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 (a) and Idaho Code § 12-121.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the plain language of Idaho's Dram Shop Act and the applicable precedent
addressing it, the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs action should be affirmed. That conclusion is
further supported by the legislative history and public policy underlying the act, which was to limit
the liability of alcohol sellers and hold individuals responsible for their own conduct. The
correctness of that conclusion is demonstrated by the facts of this case as plaintiffs specifically
alleged the service of alcohol to be a proximate cause of their injuries/damages. Further, it
encourages compliance with the law and discourages those who would seek to circumvent it by
disabling the ability to plead around the Act and its limitations. Finally, it provides appropriate
clarity, uniformity, and enforceability to a purposefully broad and mandatory statute.
Defendant has asserted that the court need not address the alternative Summary judgment
arguments. However, assuming arguendo that the Court were to address such arguments, the
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arguments and facts addressed above establish the dismissal of Plaintiffs' case is appropriate under
general negligence principles and/or based on Plaintiffs' bad faith litigation misconduct.
Additionally, as Plaintiffs' argument lacks legal and/or factual foundation, Defendant requests the
Court determine it is entitled to an award of costs and/or attorney fees. In any event, Plaintiffs'
case should be dismissed as a matter oflaw, and thus the trial court's decision should be affirmed.
DATED this 5th day of November, 2019.

BRASSEY CRAWFORD, PLLC

By

Isl J. Nick Crawford
J. Nick Crawford, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
Fat Smitty's, LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of November, 2019, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered
by the method and to the addresses indicated below:
Patrick N. George
Nolan E. Wittrock
Racine Olson Nye & Budge
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
new@racinelaw.net

XX

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 745-8160
E-File

Isl J. Nick Crawford
J. Nick Crawford
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RS 12803

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The intent of this legislat ion is to state that the decision
to consume beverage alcohol is made by the consumer .; not by
the furnishe r of such beverage alcohol, regardle ss of whether
the furnishe r is a social host or a person authoriz ed by law
to serve or sell beverage alcohol.
This legislat ion states the circumst ances under which the
furnishe r may be held respons ible for the actions of the
conswne r, but it does not include a requirem ent for convicti on
of a crimina l act. It also provides that a person filing
a claim must notify the person who sold or furnishe d the
beverage alcohol within 120 days from the date the incident
occurred .
This legislat ion should clarify legislat ive intent, which
would help resolve some of the liabilit y insuranc e problems
facing an importan t segment of Idaho's economy.

FISCAL IMPACT
There is no fiscal impact.
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MINUTES
SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE
Friday, March 7, 1986
1:30 p.m.

-

Room 426

MEMBERS PRESENT
AT ROLL CALL:

Chairman Fairchild, Senators Smyser, Darrington,
Rakozy, Bray, Dobler; Reed

MEMBERS FORMALLY
EXCUSED:

Senators Rydalch, McRoberts

MEMBERS ABSENT:

Senators Staker, Lannen

VISITORS:

Richard Kirch, Firefighters
Robert Chase, Firefighters
Mark Dunn, Idaho Restaurant & Beverage Ass'n
R.L. Nicholas, Association of Idaho Merchants
Dave Hand, Idaho Innkeepers Association
Barbara Gwartney, Hagadone Corporation
Rich Randolph, Firefighters
Lynn C. Nokes, Firefighters
Gordon Aland, Monsanto Company
Mary Kautz, Washington County Clerk
Harriet Walters, Idaho Association of Counties
Stanley Cole, Public Defense Attorneys

..

\

Moved by Senator Rakozy, second by Senator Darrington, that
the minutes of March 5, 1986 be accepted as presented .
On a voice vote, the motion passed. Senators Risch, Rydalch,
Staker, Lan~en, McRoberts absent.
·

--ras

-

12803

Prohibiting certain dram shop/social host
liability - Presented by: Senator Fairchild

MOTION

Moved by Senator Smyser, second by Senator
Bray that RS 12803 BE INTRODUCED FOR PRINTING.
On a voice vote, the motion passed.
Senators Risch, Rydalch, Staker, McRoberts,
Lannen absent.

RS 12777

Right to know - hazardous waste Presented by: Senator Fairchild

MOTION

Moved by Senator Reed, second by Senator Bray,
that RS 12777 BE INTRODUCED FOR PRINTING.
On a voice vote, the motion passed.
Senators Risch, Rydalch, Staker, McRoberts,
Lannen absent.
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Minutes
Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee
Wednesday, March 12, 1986
Page Three
.,.

--::=;>

S 1439

. ·-

~.,

. .....

Prohibiting certain dram shop/social host
liability The following persons spoke in support of
S 1439:
Dave Hand, Idaho Innkeepers Asstn
Mike Brassey responded to questions.

MOTION

Moved by Senator Lannen, second by Senator
Rydalch that S 1439 BE SENT TO THE FLOOR
WITH A DO PASS RECOMMENDATION.
The following persons spoke in opposition
to S 1439:
Jon Steele, Idaho Trial Lawyers Association
Loin Allen
Carol Bachelder
On a roll call vote, the motion passed.
Aye: Fairchild, Smyser, Rydalch, McRoberts,
Rakozy, Bray, Lannen, Reed
No:
Darrington, Staker
Senators Risch, Dobler absent.

There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned.
Respectfully submitted,

-
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Legislative Council
Committee on Alcoholic Beverages
Subcommittee on Licensing
Room 412, Statehouse
Boise, Idaho
August 12, 1985
MINUTES
The meeting of the subcommittee was called to order by the acting Chairman
Senator Lannen. Members present were: Barbara Gwartney, Ted O'Canna, William
Roden, Bud Starr, and J. R. VanTassel, Chairman Senator Carlson was absent.
Others in attendance were David Hand, Howland and Joy Croft, Mark Dunn,
Michael Fitzgerald and Representative Lydia Edwards.
Senator Lannen said the subcommittee is charged to look at licensing as it
pertains to liquor sales and recommend changes deemed necessary. A draft had
been mailed to subcommittee members previously by Mr. Lint.
Mr. Lint addressed the work of an ad hoc committee on liquor laws, and
stated their work was by no means complete, even though they had made a lot of
progress. The group was working at the request of Representative Hooper, on
the assumption the State Liquor Dispensary would still be in existence.
Mr. Lint stated that the draft he is referring to does not address licensing of distributors or manufacturers. The committee was on the verge of opening it up and doing away with preexisting requirements for licensing. Mr.
Lint said the area of how retail licenses are issued should be cleared up and
simplified, whether it should be based on land area, a portion of the population, or simply individual licenses.
.t

Mr. Roden said some really good work was done by
There was a lot of reorganization, not changes.

the

ad

hoc

committee •

Senator Lannen said his interest lies in trying to make the work of the
local businessman a little easier.
Mr. Lint pointed out that all the definitions are in the first chapter of
the draft,
Currently, they are spread throughout the law. Some definitions
would have to be dropped if the liquor dispensary goes out of business. A
definition of "school" is not presently in the Idaho Code, and it has given
the law enforcement people trouble in the past. It is defined in the draft as
a public institution.
Hr. Roden asked what this definition would do to a parochial school like
Bishop Kelly -- is that a public or private facility? Mr. Roden said the
definition could read "public or private institution accredited by the State
Board of Education." Mr. O'Canna thought that would take care of it, as long
as it is accredited.
A brief

discussion followed on the definitions of beer, wine and liquor.

Senator Lannen said the study committees come up with good ideas, but then
encounter resistance in the Idaho Legislature. He hopes most of them can agree
on this and the committee will support it.
Hr. Roden said the definition of beer would allow the sale of "near beer"
without going through the tax or having to be licensed. "Near beer" has been a
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problem in the grocery stores.
Mr. Fitzgerald said sherries are a problem now and will continue to be if
they exceed 14% alcohol. Hr. Lint said they are manufactu red in bond and that
is pretty much as it is now in the Code.
Hr. Lint said liquor licenses would be required if the alcohol content is
14.1% or more by volume. Basically , it is the same as Section 23-903, except
the definition s are all in one chapter.
A discussio n followed on the exception s to licensing , such as resorts, ski
areas, etc. Hr. Lint said the whole thing is ridiculou s.
Hr. O'Canna said at the next meeting the ad hoc committee would have
gotten into doing away with licenses based on populatio n, but did not get into
it in any depth. As to a formal county vote, the feeling of the ad hoc
committee was if a person puts up the money for a license and inventory and
can't sell it, he won't be in business for long. He will know whether he can
do business in that area, so why burden the taxpayer with a formal, expensive
vote.
Senator Lannen said he will open it up for comments on ideas this
tee would like to see changed.

commit-

Senator Lannen said one interestin g section specifies no license shall be
issued within 300 feet of a school or church. What about the neighborho od bar?
Mr. O'Canna said there are "grandfat her" rights, if it was duly licensed at
the time of enactment of the licensing requireme nts.
Senator Lannen mentioned there should be some type of liquor license for
those people in the outlying areas who are not primarily in the liquor business, who are prohibited from having a shot at this business.
Hr. Fitzgerald asked if "anti-dram shop" provision s could be written in as
part of the Code. Hr. Lint said his intent would be to obtain guideline s from
the subcommit tee and get specific wording for the bill.
"Dr:im shop11 provisions hold owners and bartender s liable for another person's actions after
liquor consumpti on. Hr. Fitzgerald said the interest rates have gone through
the roof from fear of "dram shop" provision s. He would like anti-dram shop
included as part of the proposed legislatio n.
Mr . Starr said it would put a firm burden of responsib ility on that
person. The insurance rates going up will keep people out of the liquor business.
There is a surplus of attorneys looking for any case they can find. A
lot of people have seen insurance rates go through the roof. Society has gone
overboard on a person's ability to sue and that problem needs to be addressed .
Mr. Roden said several states have adopted anti-dram shop legislatio n. In
some states it is limited to cases that involve the sale of liquor to an
intoxicate d under-age person. ln another case there had to have been a conviction of a licensee for violation of the liquor law before a lawsuit would be
allowed. Limits of liability were also imposed. Hr. Roden said he and Mike
McAlliste r have a compendium of everything current through last year.
Something needs to be done in this area. There is a lot of feeling there must be
some adult responsib ility on the part of the consumer.
2
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August Hr. Starr said Montana prohibits mid-term premium changes. Emergency rules
were filed in July without going through the committee. People were being cancelled at mid-term when there was no track record of lawsuits or liquor law
violations. It is a very real concern.
Hr. Croft said it is impossible to get dram shop insurance in Alaska. Mr.
Starr commented that it is the same situation in Wyoming. With this dram shop
thing, you have to have insurance. He stated that their premium was raised
about 40X this year. Mr. Hand said the State Insurance Commissioner in Idaho
has mailed letters covering that. It rests with the administration of the
insurance office if those things are permitted.
Mr. VanTassel said one concern is the term of licensing. It 1s the consensus in his area that it is better to have the license period come due 1n
summer as opposed to Christmas time. Moneys would be due at the beginning of
the state's fiscal year,
Mr. O'Canna said it would make more sense to extend the license for one
year from the date it is acquired. There would not be the heavy burden on the
licensing bureau and each licensee would know when that license would have to
be renewed. It is an administrative nightmare for the licensing authority to
license every outlet in the state in one month. Mr. Fitzgerald said extra
help usually is required during that time.
Senator Lannen commented that
people wait until the last second, Mr. Roden mentioned the difficulty at the
local level in locating commissioners and councilmen to approve the licenses,

•

Mr. Van Tassel said currently there is another problem with liquor
licenses. They must be put into effect within six months of the date of issuance. They are not letting the value of liquor licenses float. Licenses never
come up for sale, so artificially high prices are maintained. People are
storing them.
Mr. VanTassel said multiple use of the licenses -- same premises, separate
bars -- is another erosion of the quota system. Mr . Starr said these are distinct ent1t1es. There can be several bars under one license, but they are
totally separate. Mr, Roden said they can be diverse so long as they are under
one roof. Mr. VanTassel said it is a total erosion of what the law was meant
to be in the first place. He would like to see that eliminated, as well as no
sales on election day. Mr. Roden said they have tried to change that a couple
of times but have been unsuccessful.
Mr. VanTassel said he would like to see the hours of sale changed. He is
conce't'ned with "border-hopping." Shift workers have to wait to get a beer,
which is a nuisance for them.
Mr. Starr said he is concerned with limits of liability with dram shop
laws as well as advertising. Hours of operation should be compatible with the
surrounding states -- we should have 2 a.m. closing and Sunday sales.
Mr. Dunn said the dram shop problem is serious and needs to be addressed,
He receives calls everyday from members about the insurance rates. He also has
a real concern about the quota system and compensation for existing licenses.
Senator Lannen commented that it would be hard to compensate for those
licenses. Mr. O1 Canna said if someone paid $75,000 for a Liquor license and
the quota system was dispensed with, that individual would still have the
expense of that license. Perhaps a $15,000 tax credit could be given for the
3
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following five years to compensate for that loss. This question was due to be
addressed by the ad hoc committee.
Senator Lannen said it would be a really touchy situation. He does not
care for the quota system but it would be difficult to completely do away with
it. Mr. Fitzgerald commented that the license is listed on his balance sheet
as an asset and money can be borrowed against it.
Mr. Hand said his concerns are basically the same as have already been
mentioned. There should be some type of control. (1) As to the dram shop,
there should be a limit on the liability, or total anti-dram shop; (2) Sunday
sales, later hours; (3) protection of the quota system. How do you protect
people for value put forth in good faith? The 10% transfer fee ended up being
a compromise.
Mr. Fitzgerald listed his concerns in order: (1) Dram shop; (2) Sunday
sales; and (3) different categories of liquor defined by what they are. The
state liquor store doesn't bring in the finer sherries because they are not
moving. They cannot be sold anywhere else. The common roof law is good, exposing it to the liability of if one loses, all lose.
Mr. Croft said he agrees with the previous comments on the dram shop
legislation. Hrs. Croft said she is concerned about the beer distributors not
being permitted to dispense certain advertising aids. They are allowed to give
us posters, matches, etc., but are not allowed to aid or abet in any way. She
asked, "Why can't we put that in some way, so we can obtain free coasters,
cups, or whatever they have to give us?" Senator Lannen agreed that is a good
point. They are simply business people and he can see no reason for the State
saying they cannot have these things. Hrs. Croft said Coors Distributing could
not give them cups with their logo. It's kind of silly. These things were to
be used for sorority affairs.
Senator Lannen said he is interested in straightening out those things.
The state has gone a long way with stiff penalties for DUI. The business
people should not be hindered by these laws.
Mr. O'Canna said it was a federal law originally. When prohibition was
repealed, the federal government enacted laws to not tolerate that kind of
thing. As the laws were written they would allow me to subsidize a retailer to
freeze small ones out of business. Many state laws followed the federal laws.
We cannot legally subsidize the retailer.
Mr. Roden said there are parallel laws. 11To the exclusion of others" is
the way the federal law reads. The guy with the most money would freeze out
the little guy and you would have a monopolistic situation.
Mr. Roden said he would like to comment on what Hr. O'Canna and Mrs. Croft
are saying. The Idaho law has been a sore subject among retailers and wholesalers. When there is a new director, the interpretations change. It is inconsistent in different parts of Idaho. The part of the law on aid to retailers
needs to be rewritten. It is probably not desirable to do away with it altogether. There are fewer brewers and wineries all the time. The big get bigger.
It does away with the right of small breweries to maintain any kind of position in the market and is similar to the federal anti-trust laws. It needs to
be clarified.
4
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Mr. Roden said he agrees with the others. The dram shop is a primary
issue. Days, age and hours of sale are also a primary issue. The age of consumption is an issue. If any committee does anything with the age of consumption, it should be tied in with days and hours of sale. Mr. Roden added that
he hopes this subcommittee will look at it that way.
Senator Lannen asked if Idaho should get on "bended knee" and say yes to
the people concerned about the age of 21? We should go to the Sunday sale of
liquor and 2 a.m. closing to be consistent. Senator Lannen said he believes in
the states' right to determine things such as the legal drinking age without
having a gun put to their heads.
Mr. Roden commented on the shift work in industrial areas and the time of
closing. Actually the starting time is almost as important. People get off
work at 6 a.m. and that's their evening, their happy hour. Mr. Roden said he
hopes this will be taken into consideration. Concerning allowing a particular
county to change these hours, Mr. Roden said it is his personal preference to
preempt the counties' rights to do that, as it is not practical.
Senator Lannen said the people in a county should have to vote to prohibit
it. It should be automatic until the majority of the people say they don't
want it, but this would give some local option.

•

Mr. Roden said the counties originally had to opt out of the program with
the wine law, but that was changed. A golf course or special license might not
be allowed in a county which has a municipality that does not offer liquor
by-the-drink. Mr. Roden used the example of Franklin County where there is no
municipality that has liquor by-the-drink. It would be one way to hasten this,
but may not be too practical.
Senator Lannen said he would like to see some changes in special licenses,
or for outlying areas counties allowing a certain portion of the population,
particularly in northern Idaho where there are a number of fine eating establishments that do not qualify for a liquor license. They can have wine and
canned cocktails, but no liquor. Senator Lannen said these people should not
be discriminated against because they have no lake frontage or golf course.
Senator Lannen suggested that if feasible, if a large amount of food was
served, cocktails could be sold whether the establishment was in or out of the
city. The license is paid by people in the city. There must be some vehicle
whereby people, particularly those in the rural areas with nice eating establishments, would not be locked out . There is no way presently for them to get
a liquor license. Senator Lannen asked for comments on how this should be
addressed.
Mr. Starr said this is handled in the Washington law through a 60/40
11
split, Basically we are taking a restaurant that has already invested 11x
number of dollars in a liquor license and the neighbor next door hasn't, but
could get one for $500 from the state. How would that affect those people
already licensed? The basic law is not right. People tried to live within the
law and made huge investments. There are 706 liquor licenses in the state
right now. It has created a false economy. The state should come up with some
form or method of reimbursement,
Hr. Dunn asked if it is possible to eliminate the requirement that a liquor license be in an incorporated city and have a county quota system?
Hr.
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Ruden said thi:-1 can be ,lone legally. benaLur l.;rn m :n ~:11..•d 1l t.hl•rt: •1hould be a
city as wet l as county quota system, keeping sp1:cia1 purpo!le licenses out.
Ther~ is a fee included in anything we do. Any l icense'I i 1HmP.d ;rn spec i 11 l purpose licennes should be clarified in the Code whether the special purpose use
is inside or outside the city limits ao it does not affect the quota inside
the city, and the city must issue it as a special purpose l i cen~e.

Mr. Roden s11id moc;t license!! cannot be tranuferred, hut d t.ed the case of
Turf Club in Boise which was catered to. Now they 'lualify tur their own
license because they built a golf course in the middle. Jn Lewiston it is
immediately outside the city boundary. Something needs to be done. It is obviously written with no requirement [or members. Mr. Roden s~id he hates to see
~pec1al e~emptions, yet ther~ is une thev really need -- AtlanLa is out in the
boondocks and har. a large summer populat11, n. Ct is not entir-~ly the fault of
rhe liquor law. Originally you had to be in a municipal ', ty to have a liquor
license because that's where the law enforcement was. A municipality could be
easily formed. Maybe the population require ment is the same, but it could not
be done without the consent of the neighboring city. Atlanta can't incorporate. The city limits in Crouch are 25 miles long, runnin~ down the center of
the highway, picking up Rankq and back up the rive r, What would be a sensible
qolution Lo this? rf we are ~tnrting over, maybe the re sho~ld he no population
requirement, perhaps a counly ordinance subject. to zon1n~ .

th~

l:om:ern1ng reimburst'menL lor larv~ 111ve~tmau1 'I u1 I iquur lic.ense!.., Mr.
R~•den said he (eels a tax credit iH almo s t me.tningL P..<:s, 11s rhe industry today
is depressed. A practical way might ha to allo•., a credit against the sales
tax, but the state would not want to loc;e. that rev~nue a~ LL involves most
busi~Psses. A tax credit against income taK would be a mean1~gl~sd replacement
prugram.
said his nrea i~ a recreational-type cn~ironment with lots
thPy tJ+,•Jll wit.h hur,l ing,
•;m,wc11ttinr, and other recre,1t.ior,al uses. Thec;e areas are s ,·t up to cr,ntribute
fot th~ l'.l•1erRl l gc,ud of the ,tate t. ourism industry.
Mr.

Vantassel

nf peoplr-> cnmir,g in for Rnowmobi I ing. /\rmmrt Dixie

'lt=?nat.or J.ann,:rn Raid if thP.y can't get some meanin~ful eh1mp,e, m,qybe they
1
cnn 111,1ke a ne.., lic;t and consider expanding the 'spei:ial'1 sp-:cial licenses.
f;1e lack of Sunday sales and l a,m, closing hllVH bt-!en crn;tly Lo the
hospi t ality industry in Idaho ov~r the past few ye11rc;. A lot 0f people from
northPrn ld11ho now ~o across the Washington bordvr tn hnvP dinner simply
b<•,a1Hl ~ thP.y 1-..nnr Lo have :1 couplP. o f r,w [, t:iil'I with ,Jim, P r ,rn,J nrl'! willing to
•lrivP I.he- ,ii,;tr.11rP. tn do it. S,•nr.tnr Lnnnc,11 rPilc>r<1IPrl hie: c•>ncPrn t.o c;ee
1

·h:in11.~ ·• in 1.h11t 11rc11.

1-1:i. 1:warLlll'Y !l :ud t lu•y h.-tVl' lt,1d :ievt-!ral ~•du,·,n tun work : ho1r,-i ,,,, .-tn1m c;hop
l1 .1h• l iry 11nd •;he wn11 ld likP. to n•ii11-;t 1n wnrking w1 1. h th,• ,ri,;11ran r:e irrd11•i1.ry
1 '' h,1 •, ,., •;nmP. type ol reducPd prnmi11m:1 tor "mpl oyee 1, who havr b,~en
tht·uu~h an
r1i111: at. inn rnur~E>. Th"! Cummis •don hit-. talked ,1bout it. •

M•;. Gwartn1•y <;Aid r.hP. wo11lcl ,..,,rt :1inly r,up pnrt ·;un.J1~ r;al"':i and 2 a.m.
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December - 99
Subcommittee on Licensing
Committee on Alcoholic Beverages
House Caucus Room, Statehouse
December 9 1 1985
Present at the subcommittee meeting were Acting Chairman Senator Lannen,
Dave Hand, Chris Nielsen, Ted O'Canna, Bud Starr, R. L. Nicholas, J. R.
VanTassel, and staff Lint and Cory.
Senator Lannen asked Mr. Lint to explain the various pieces
legislation which had been drafted for the subcommittee members.

of

proposed

Mr. Lint said Senator Carlson met informally with Hr. Hand and Hr. Roden
and went over some things in order to give his opinion and approach.
Senator Carlson wanted to discuss LC0235, which is a total recodification
of the liquor laws. Section 2 provides a time frame (January 1, 1987) for the
Liquor Dispensary to be phased out which is probably unrealistic and deserves
a closer look.
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Under the new Title 23, Chapter 1 is entirely definitions. Chapter 2
relates to licenses required to sell or resell any beverage alcohol. Application for license would be made to the Director of Law Enforcement, with a
$1,000 fee to retail beverage alcohol; other licenses would be set at $2,000
per year. The application is simple -- name and address of the applicant, and
if the applicant is not the owner of the property, certification from the
owner of the property that it is all right to sell beverage alcohol at that
address. A person convicted of a felony who has served his time would be eligible for a license, so long as he has the money, on the assumption that he
has been rehabilitated. An establishment selling beverage alcohol would not be
allowed within 300 feet of any churches or schools; the licensing period would
be for one year, and not all licenses would have the same expiration date. It
would provide for the licensee to license his establishment for part of a
year, and, depending on the date best suited to that person, then be licensed
for one year, i.e., a staggered system.
Chapter 3 deals with regulation and enforcement and prohibits dram shop
liability in most cases. It would be illegal to: sell without a license or
sell to a minor (with definition of a minor as 19 years of age). Under the
sales 1 restriction, booze cannot be sold or given away to a minor or an obviously intoxicated person. Also illegal: buying booze for a minor, or false
representation of age.
Rules and regulations would be promulgated by the Director of the Department of Law Enforcement. Penalties would be set. The only tax involved would
be a sales tax, whether buying a bottle or a drink.
Hr. Lint said Senator Carlson realizes this bill probably will not go anywhere, but offers it strictly for discussion purposes for other items the subcommittee is looking at. Hr. Lint added that this might be the best bill, if
one believes totally in private enterprise, but also doubts that it would go
anywhere.
Mr. O'Canna thought the staggered expiration dates for licenses was a good
idea. Mr. Hand said there are many individual noteworthy items in this proposal, but they are not in a position to be bargaining for control of beverage
alcohol. Senator Lannen said changes will continue to be oiecemeal,
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